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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE B. CATMULL and FLORENCE M. CATMULL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
GEORGE T. JOHNSON, SNOWBIRD,
LTD., and RICHARD D. BASS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13927

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action the plamtiffs-respondente recovered
a judgment against defendants-appellants on a contract
for payment of royalties in connection with use of certain
real propeorty located in Little Cottonwood Canyon, Salt
Lake County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted a judgment for the plaintiffsrespondents as against defendants-appellants George T.
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Johnson and Snowbird, Ltd. in the total amount of
$9,698.60, and dismissed the plaintiffs-respondents' cause
of action as against defendant Richard D. Bass.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the judgment entered against them below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 28, 1966, plaintiffs-respondents (here^
after referred to as "Cattmulls," George B. Catmull hereafter referred to individually as "Gatmull") deeded to
defendant George T. Johnson (hereafter referred to as
"Johnson") all of their right, title and interest in certain
mining claims patented in the name of Gatmull, located
in little Cottonwood Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah
(hereafter referred to as the "Free Coinage Claims") (Ex.
8-P). This deed was subject to an agreement also dated
February 28,1966, between Johnson and Catmull, whereby Johnson agreed,, in relevant part, to pay to Catmull
a percentage of the gross receipts received by
[Johnson] from any ski lift erected upon the
above described lands, according to the following terms:
(a) Five percent (5%) of gross receipts
if such lift is erected wholly upon the subject
lands;
(b) If such lift is erected only partially
upon the subject lands, said five percent (5%)
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of gross receipts shall be prorated in ratio of
the length of such lift on the subject lands as
against 'the total length of such lift; but in no
event shall grantor receive less than two percent
(2%) of said gross receipts. Ex. 5-P.
This agreement shall hereafter be referred to as "the
1966 Agreement."
Subsequent to the 1966 Agreement, Johnson deeded
the Free Coinage Claims to one Alta Snowbird Ltd., a
Utah limited partnership. Shortly thereafter Alta Snowbird Ltd. conveyed it to defendant-appellant Snowbird
Ltd. (hereafter referred to as "Snowbird") a Utah limited
partnership. When Snowbird encoimtered difficulties in
obtaining financing in order to realize its plans for the
construction of a ski resort in the environs of the Free
Coinage Claims, Johnson initiated negotiations with Catmull (R. 32, 42-44, 76, 87). These negotiations culminated
in a document entitled Amendment to Agreement, dated
December 18, 1969, which provided in relevant part as
follows:
For valuable consideration, I [Catmull] hereby amend our Agreement of February 28, 1966
to provide that you or any successor in interest
may purchase and acquire all of my rights and
interests under said Agreement upon payment to
me in cash as follows:
If paid on or before July 1, 1970 the total
price shall be $17,000.00.
If paid after July 1, 1970 the total price
shall be $21,000.00. Ex. 1-D.
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This Amendment to Agreement is hereafter referred to as
"the 1969 Amendment."
Johnson paid Catmull the sum of $10 as consideration
for the 1969 Amendment, by a check dated December 18,
1969, on which it was noted "For Amendment to Agreement of February 28, 1966" (R. 35, Ex. 3-D).
In January, 1970 Snowbird obtained major financing
and commenced to a>nstruct its ski facilities in Little
Cottonwood Canyon, Major construction was concentrated in the summer of 1970 on the main lodge and tram
facilities (R. 36). In the summer of 1971, construction
was commenced on the Gad II chairlift which lift crossed
the Free Coinage Claims for a linear distance of approximately 922 feet (R. 36, Ex. 13-P). By February, 1972, the
Gad II lift was in operation and generating revenues (R.
36-37). The total cable length of Gad II is 4,059 feet
(R. 186); the vertical rise from the bottom of the lift
to the top of the lift is 1249 feet (R. 151, Ex. 22-P);
Gad II's maximum capacity to carry passengers to the
top is 1200 passengers per hour (R. 137, Ex. 11-P).
In the fall of 1972 Johnson attempted to initiate discusions with Oatmull in connection with exercising his
rights under the 1969 Amendment (R. 38). In April,
1973, Johnson offered Catmull the sum of $17,000 for
purchase of Oatmuirs rights under the 1966 Agreement,
which offer was refused by Catmull (R. 39). By a letter
dated May 16, 1973, Catmull informed Johnson that he
did not want to sell his royalty rights on the Free Coinage Claims (Ex. 6-P). On May 24, 1969, Johnson ten-
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denied a draft in the amount of $21y000 to Catmuli, fbo*
purchase of CaitmuU's rights under the 1966 Agreement,
as per the terms of the 1969 Amendment, and Caitmull
refused the tender (R. 40, Ex. 4-D). Prior to May, 1973,
Cajtmull at no time made a specific demand on Johnson
or on Snowbird for payment of royalties or for payment
of the $21,000 according to the terms of the 1969 Amendment (R. 201).
Thereafter this litigation was commenced, Catmulls
seeking a judgment for the royalties claimed as due pursuant to the 1966 Agreement. Johnson and Snowbird refused payment of the claimed royalties on the grounds
that Oa/tmuU's refusal of the May, 1973 tender was
wrongful, and that they had a right, pursuant to the 1969
Amendment, to purchase CaitmuU's royalty rights for the
sum of $21,000.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT WAS VOID FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND LACK OF MUTUALITY.
The trial court concluded that the 1969 Amendment
was void and unenforceable by Johnson because of lack
of consideration and lack of mutuality. Conclusions of
Law, paragraph 3; Memorandum Decision, paragraph 2.
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court was clearly in
error.
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By the 1969 Amendment, Catmull gave Johnson an
option to purchase his rights in the Free Coinage Claims
for the sum of $17,000' if exercised within six months, or
for the sum of $21,000 if exercised thereafter. The Amendment itself does not contain the word "option," but the
rights and liabilities created by the 1969 Amendment are
clearly within the scope of what is commonly referred
to as an option. Professor Williston defines an option as:
a unilateral contract whereby the optionor for a
valuable consideration grants the optionee a right
to make a contract of purchase but does not
bind the optionee to do so; the optionor is bound
during the life of the option, but the optionee
is not. 1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd ed. 1957)
§ 61A. (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
Professor Williston further notes:
The fact that the optionee is free while the
optionor is bound raises the question whether
mutuality plays a part in the option transaction.
Written agreements known as options are not
necessarily void for lack of mutuality, and, where
accepted within the time specified, may become
valid and enforceable contracts. Mutuality of
obligation can be supplied by adding the contractual ingredient known as consideration.
*

*

*

Consideration sufficient to support the usual
contract will support an option. 1 Williston on
Contracts, (3rd ed. 1957) § 61B. (Footnotes and
citations omitted.)
See also Steel v. Eagle, (1971) 207 Kan. 146, 483 P. 2d
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1063; Mack v. Coker, (1974) 22 Ariz. App. 105, 523 P.
2d 1342.
In the instant matter, it is uncootroverted that Johnson paid the sum of $10 to Catmull as consideration for
the 1969 Amendment. Johnson's check in that amount,
dated December 18, 1969 and marked with specific reference to the 1969 Amendment, was introduced into evidence (Ex. 3-D). This is clearly sufficient consMeration
to support the option as a unilateral contract binding
upon Catmull and enforceable according to its terms by
Johnson. In Baker v. Mulrooney, (8th Cir. 1920) 265
F. 529, the court enforced an option which was supported
by the sum of $10, holding that such a sum was sufficient
consdideration to make the offer of sale a grant of an irrevocable and exclusive option.
The trial court may have confused the necessity of
contractual consideration with the concept of mutuality
of obligation. It is certainly true that Johnson, by the
terms of the 1969 Amendment, bad no obligation to purchase Catmull's rights in the Free Coinage Claims. However mutuality of obligation is not always necessary for
a contract to be binding and enforceable. The Supreme
Court of Utah has distinguished the two concepts of
mutuality of obligation and contractual consideration as
follows:
The doctrine of mutuality of obligation appears
to be merely one aspect of the rule that mutual
promises constitute considerations for each other.
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Where there is no other consideration for a contract, mutual promises must be binding on both
parities. But where there is any other consideration for the contract, mutuality of obligation
is not essential. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy,
(1951) 120 Utah 608, 612, 237 P. 2d 823, 825.
The $10 consideration given by Johnson to Caitmull
for the 1969 Amendment is not disputed herein. Clearly
the trial court's conclusion that the Amendment was unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality of
obligation was erroneous, and should foe reversed by this
court.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 1969 AMENDMENT WAS
UNENFORCEABLE IN MAY, 1973 DUE TO
THE LAPSE OF TIME.
The trial court concluded that the 1969 Amendment,
Which had no specific expiration date with respect to the
option to purchase for $21,000, gave Johnson the right
to purchase the Free Coinage Claims for a reasonable
period of time. Memorandum Decision, paragraph 2; Conclusions of Law, paragraph 3. Such a construction of the
open-ended offer is in accordance with decisions in this
jurisdiction and generally. See Commercial Security Bank
of Ogden v. Johnson, (1946) 110 Utah 342,173 P. 2d 277;
Colorado Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing
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Co., (1945) 114 Colo. 237,157 P. 2d 612; Boswell v. United
States, (5th Cir. 1941) 123 F. 2d 213. However, the *rial
court erroneously concluded that more than a reasonable
time period had passed following the execution of the
1969 Amendment and before Johnson's tender of the
$21,000, and that therefore the option had expired prior
to Johnson's tender. This conclusion is not supported by
the evidence.
In Utah, the test for determining what is a reasonable period of time for performance of a contractual obligation is as follows:
So much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract
or duty require should be done in a particular
case.
So much time as is necessary, for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires should
be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other part to be
affected. Commercial Security Bank of Ogden
v. Johnson, (1946) 110 Utah 342, 349, 173 P. 2d
277,281. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
When the facts are not disputed, as in the instant
matter, the deteaiiimation of what is a reasonable period
of time is a conclusion of law, and is therefore subject
to the full review of this Court. Alpern v. May fair Markets, (1953) 118 Gal. App. 2d 541, 258 P. 2d 7; Colorado
Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co.,
(1945) 114 Colo. 237, 157 P. 2d 612.
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The leading case in Utah to deal with the facts and
circumstances relevant to the question of what is a "reasonable time" is Commercial Security Bank of Ogden v.
Johnson, supra. That case involved the sale of certain
real property by the defendants-sellers to the plaintiffspurchasers. The contract of sale provided that, as part
of the consideration for the sale, the purchasers would
construct and put into operation an industrial alcohol
distilling plant on the subject premises. Following delivery of the deed to the buyers, the buyers made preparations for the conisttiiudionL of the pliant. However, they
were unable to obtain adequate financing for the planned
cx>nstruction, and the plant was never built. After a
period of nearly four years, the sellers rented the premises to a third party and demanded rescission of the
contract. Since the parties had not specified a date for
completion of the plant's construction, the issue as to
whether or not the sellers could rightfully rescind depended upon whether the four year period of time was
more than a "reasonable time" for the buyers to have
performed their contractual obligation.
The court focused upon the factors considered by
the parties themselves, at the time they contracted, in
order to determine! the issue of reasonable time. The
buyers contended that their difficulties in obtaining financing were to be considered as one of the relevant
circumstances in evaluating the reasonableness of the
delay. However,,, the court concluded that the parties
had not contracted with reference to the buyer's finan-
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cial abilities. Rather, the sellers (church affiliated corporations and individuals) were interested in achieving
the construction and actual operation of the plant, in
order that employment opportunities would be created for
the local populace. The buyers were well aware of this.
The court noted:
The Seller and Buyer did not contract in
reference to the financing of the venture. It is
apparent that the Seller assumed the Buyers
were able financially to start and complete the
plant and to put it into operation. . . . As revealed by the record the reason the Seller was
interested in the consitruction and operation of
the plant was to provide employment for the people living in that vicinity. That purpose was
well known to the Buyers. That purpose could
be fulfilled only by the construction of the plant
and putting it into operation in a short time
and not years later.. . . The financial difficulties
of the Buyers . . . were not caused by the Seller.
Time lost by such internal troubles of the Company and personal difficulties of the Buyers was
time taken from the reasonable time allowed the
Buyers and Company to fulfill their pant of the
contract. The financial difficulties are immaterial so far as determining what was a reasonable
time for performance of the contract. 110 Utah
342, 350, 173 P. 2d 277, 281-282.
The court concluded that the four year lapse justified
rescission of the contract.
Applying the court's analysis in Commercial Security
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra, to the instant situa-
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tion, it is dear that Johnson's tender of $21,000 to Catmull in May, 1973, was well within a reasonable period
of time. In the instant matter, the parties contracted
with specific reference! to the financing of the Snowbird
ski resort facility. Catmull was made fully aware of
Johnson's financing problems at the time he signed the
1969 Amendment (R, 32, 42-44, 76, 87). And Catmull
was also well aware that the ultimate purpose of Johnson's acquisition of the Free Coinage Claims was to construct and operate a ski resort facility in the area. At
the time of the 1969 Amendment, Catmull knew that
there were no lifts or other ski facilities in operation, or
even under consitruciion (R. 80, 87). In this case, the
reasonableness of the time lapse must be measured with
reference to these two contemplated occurrences, financing of the ski facilities and the eventual revneue-generating operation of the facilities.
The record shows that Johnson was able to acquire
financing for Snowbird shortly after the execution of the
1969 Amendment (R. 35), Construction commenced almost immediately bat no facilities opened until December, 1971 and January, 1972 (R, 49). No revenue was
generated by the Gad II lift, which crosses the Free Coinage claims, until February, 1972 (R. 36-37). Throughout
1972 and 1973 Johnson made efforts to raise the money
necessary in order to exercise his option on the Free Coinage Claims. With the facilties finally generating revenues, Johnson tried to retain sufficient money to pay
Catmull the $21,000 (R. 38). In the spring of 1973 John-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
son was able to make the $21,000 tender, but even at
this time he had difficulty raising the necessary amount.
Johnson communicated these difficulties to Catmull (R.
39, 47). The Snowbird operating statements admitted
into evidence are ample support for Johnson's testimony
as to the difficulties he encountered in setting aside funds
from the operation revenues. The ski facility netted a
meager profit of $647.17 for the year ending May 31,
1972, and netted a loss in the amount of $698,864.08 for
the year ending May 31, 1973 (Ex. 14-D). That any
funds were available at all for Johnson's tender in May,
1973, is a credit to his diligent efforts as manager of the
resort facilities to set aside funds for the Free Coinage
Claims. The losses suffered by the resort in 1973, and
the slim profit from the preceding year, indicate that the
delay in the tender was the direct result of the resort's
financial condition, rather than unjustified dihtoriness.
Of further significance is the evidence that Catmull
was not materially prejudiced by the delay in Johnson's
tender. This is unlike the sellers in Commercial Security
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra, whose sole purpose in
contracting was frustrated by the delay in the buyers'
performance. The record reveals no interest of Catmull
in the performance of the 1969 Amendment other than
his desire to receive valuable consideration for his remaining interest in the Free Coinage Claims. He did have a
need for some immediate cash, in order to take advantage
of an investment opportunity in 1969. This is why he
agreed to accept the $17,000 figure for the first six months
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of the option term (R. 87, 89). However, the terms of
the 1969 Amendment dearly indicate that Catmull's
willingness to sell was not solely predicated on receiving
immediate cash, for he agreed to accept the $21,000 option
figure for an indefinite time following the six month offer
at $17,000.
Other jurisdictions have applied the same test as
that noted above, applied by the Utah Supreme Court
in Commercial Security Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra,
for determining what is a "reasonable time" for performance of a contract. In Colorado Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co., (1945) 114 Colo. 237, 157
P. 2d 612,, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a time
lapse of approximately six years was reasonable in the
light of the facts and circumstances of the case. The
plaintiff in that case, a church-affiliated college, had
obtained from the defendant-creditor a pledge in the
amount of $2,500. This sum was to be in reduction of
the note then outsitanding irom the college to the creditor,
on the express condition that the college first secure
sufficient funds to pay all its other outstanding old
accounts and certain second mortgage bonds. The record
indicated that the college had diligently pursued fundraising activities and finaly was able to tender to the
creditor its balance due on the note, minus the pledge
amount. The court noted:
The measure of reasonable time is not by a
period of limitation, but by the diligence and
capability of endeavor and the reasonable adap-
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totion of methods to the end to be accomplished.
157 P. 2d 612, 615.
The court noted that the creditor had not been damaged
by the delay and that the college had
diligently and continuously kept up its solicitations during the entire period in its endeavor
to meet the condition . . . and clear up its debts,
and there is no evidence of suspension or inefficiency or indifference or unnecessary delay, or
of taking longer than was necessary conveniently to perform the condition. 157 P. 2d 612,
616. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in the instant matter, the record clearly
indicates that the tender of $21,000 was made as soon as
it was conveniently possible. During the first years of
a resort operation, when so much money must be expended for capital outlay, the revenues are insufficient
to meet the expenses of the young enterprise. It must
be emphasized that under Utah law, as well as Colorado
law, appellants were not obliged to sacrifice other legitimate business expenses and needs in order to produce
the $21,000 tender. Since the parties were clearly contracting with specific reference to Snowbird's financing
and operations, Snowbird's obligation was to produce the
tender as soon as it was conveniently able to do so, following diligent and reasonable efforts to raise the money.
The record is clear that such diligent and reasonable
efforts were made by Johnson and Snowbird . The tender
in May, 1973, was made as soon as it was feasible, and
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well within a reasonable time following execution of the
1969 Amendment. None of the facts leading to this conclusion are in dispute. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the trial court's erroneous conclusion with respect to the reasonaibleness of the lapse of time.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 1969 AMENDMENT WAS
UNENFORCEABLE IN M A Y , 1973, BECAUSE CATMULL HAD AN OBLIGATION
TO DEMAND PERFORMANCE BEFORE
TERMINATING THE CONTRACT.
Although this issue has never been squarely raised
in Utah, other jurisdictions have consistently applied the
rule that when the time for performance of a contract
is mdefinite, a party desiring to no longer be bound by
the contract must "place the other party in default," by
demanding the contractual performance and allowing the
other party a reasonable opportunity thereafter to perform. Glen Cove Marina, Inc. v. The Vessel Little Jennie,
(E. D. N. Y. 1967) 269 F. Supp. 877; Boswell v. United
States, (5th Cir. 1941) 123 F. 2d 213; Dempsey v. Stauffer,
(3rd Cir. 1962) 312 F. 2d 360 (applying Pennsylvania
law); Johnston v. Rothenberg, (1960) 270 Ala. 304, 118
So. 2d 744; Leonard v. Rose, (1967) 65 Cal. 2d 589, 422
P. 2d 604, 55 Cal. Rptar. 916.
In Colorado Woman's College v. Bradford-Robinson
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Printing Co., supra, discussed above, the Court noted that
the failure on the part of the defendant-creditor to demand payment by the college was a basis for denying the
creditor avoidance of its contractiial obligation. The court
noted:
Time [for performance by the college] was not
essential. The company could not in good conscience be permitted Imowingly to let the efforts
and expenses continue and other contributions
be made, all on the strength of its pledge, by
silence inducing the belief it was still recognized
and in force, when in fact the company had secretly determined to refuse p a y m e n t . . . In such
situation the company was required to notify the
college giving a definite and reasonable time for
complying with the condition. This is sometimes
referred to as making time of the essence. Until
a party is put in default, he may perform a condition for which the contract fixes no time. It
is settled law that unless time is of the essence
of a contract, mere lapse of time does not avoid
it or forfeit rights under it. And it is equally
well settled that time is not of the essence of a
contract which provides for a reasonable time.
157 F. 2d 612, 616 (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Another case so holding, which is especially applicable to the instant matter, is Davis v. Cordell, (1960) 237
So. C. 88,115 S. E. 2d 649. In .thait case the plaintiff-seUer
brought an action for rescission of a contract for the sale
of land to the defendant-purchaser. The trial court ordered the contract vacated on the grounds that the de-
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fendant had delayed unreasonably in tendering the bulk
of the purchase price due on the contract. There was
no payment date specified in the ciontraot. The appellate
court reversed, on the grounds that the seller had no
right to rescind the contract and avoid the obligation to
sell when she had not made a specific demand upon the
buyer to tender the money due. The court noted:
Time is not of the essence of a contract which
is to be performed within a reasonable time, but
either party can make it so . . . by simply giving
notice to that effect. // notice is not given, the
contract remains in force. It may be sued on
as and existing contract and damages for its
breach recovered. But it cannot be treated as at
an end and a forfeiture enforced.
*

*

*

Respondent was bound by her contract to allow
appellant; a reasonable time for payment of the
purchase price. The just and equitable principle
before mentioned required that before termination of his rights under the contract by the extreme remedy of rescission, appellant be given
express, unequivocal and reasonable notice that
unless within a specified time he should pay the
purchase price in full . . . his rights would be so
terminated. It appears that on several occasions
. . . respondent made demand upon appellant for
"some money" under the contract; but never
did she notify him of any definite time after
which, upon his having failed to pay, she would
rescind it. 115 S, E. 2d 649, 655-6. (Emphasis
added.)
The implications of this rule of law on the instant
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situation are clear. At no time did Catmull demand of
Johnson payment of the $21,000 purchase price, thereby placing him in default. The first indication of Catmull's unwillingness to hooor his obligation was by a letter
dated May 16, 1973 addressed to Johnson from Catmull,
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 6-P. In that letter,
Catmull stated:
I wish to advise you I do Not Desire to sell My
royalty on the property I sold you for any price.
Even if this flat denial of obligation possibly could be
construed as a demand for performance within a reasonable time, Johnson responded with full performance of
his obligation only eight days thereafter (Ex. 2-D), undoubtedly a reasonable time in which to raise such a sum
of money.
Without a clear, unequivocal demand for performance
Catmull had no right to abandon his obligations under
the binding 1969 Amendment, and refuse Johnson's tender of the $21,000. The evidence is undisputed that no
such demand was made. On this basis alone, this Court
should reverse the ruling of the trial court and order
specific performance of the 1969 Amendment.
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING AS THE ROYALTY FORMULA THAT
METHOD USED BY THE UNITED STATES
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FOREST SERVICE IN ITS SPECIAL USE
PERMIT.
There was lengthy testimony before the trial court
concerning the proper method to be used in calculating
the royalties provided for in the 1966 Agreement. The
1966 Agreement provided that Catmull was to receive a
minimum of two percent of the gross receipts attributable
to the Gad II lift. The problem before the trial court was
to fairly calculate what portion of the total lift operating
receipts was fairly attributable to the Gad II lift, since
no special pass is sold for skiing only on the Gad II lift.
Assuming of course that enforcement of the 1966 Agreement is proper, Catmull is entitled to two percent of whatever figure is determined to represent the Gad II lift
gross receipts.
The trial court concluded that the proper method to
use in calculating the revenue attributable to the Gad II
was the methodology used by the Forest Service in its
Term Special Use Permit for Snowbird. Memorandum
Decision, paragraph 3, Findings of Fact, paragraph 16.
However, this conclusion is not supported by the evidence,
and in fact is in contravention of uncontradicted testimony and evidence before the court concerning the use
which is in fact made of the Gad II lift.
The record clearly indicates that the calculation of
revenues attributable to particular ski lift is a more complex matter than simply counting heads and ascertaining
the total number of passenger rides any one lift performs
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compared to other lifts. The complexity is caused by the
fact that short lifts, which go into relatively easy skiing
terrain, will transport a skier several more times in one
day than will a longer lift which ventures into steeper
and more difficult terrain. To equate a short "easy" ride
with a long and "difficult" ride is unrealistic, especially
when ski passes are purchased for a period of time (an
all-day pass or a half-day pass, for example) rather than
by a unit price per ride (R. 166, 197). Hence, the easiest
method, of simply counting passenger rides for all facilities and passenger rides for the Gad II lift, and then
taking the percentage of total tram-lift revenue equivalent
to the percentage of Gad II passenger rides to total passenger rides, is not reflective of the true revenue generating power of Gad II.
The United States Forest Service (hereafter "Forest
Service") acknowledges as much in its manner of calculating its permit fees. The Forest Service has granted
a Term Special Use Permit to Snowbird authorizing winter sport use of certain forest land in the environs of the
Snowbird resort (Ex. 12). The fee for such use is two
percent of the net sales and other income from the facilities located on forest land. Hence the Forest Service has
a problem at least facially comparable to that created by
the 1966 Agreement, i.e. attributing revenue to particular
ski facilities and lite.
The Forest Service calculates its permit fees by multiplying the total passenger capacity of all Snowbird's
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lifts by the total slope distances of all Snowbird's lifts.
The percentage of this figure which crosses forest land
is then calculated. The resulting figure is multiplied by
.02 in order to arrive at fee Forest Service's two percent
permit fee. The calculation basically evaluates the passenger capacity and the slope distance as the relevant
factors by which to evaluate revenue-generating power
of a lift facility (R. 161). This is the formula ordered
by the trial court to be used in connection with the 1966
Agreement at issue herein.
However the trial court had better, and more probative evidence at hand by which to calculate the Gad
II revenues. Snowbird called as a witness its manager
of up-hill facilities, David Weatberbee (hereafter
"Weatherbee") who gave extensive testimony as to his
own on-site daily observations of the use made of the
Gad II lift at Snowbird. He testified that Gad II in fact
only contributes approximately five to six percent of the
total tram-lift revenue at Snowbird, as opposed to the
approximate 21% figure resulting from use of the Forest
Service formula (R. 161). He fully explained the basis
for this conclusion, with testimony which was neither
impeached nor contradicted in the record. Weatherbee
noted several factors tending to reduce the actual use
of Gad II: (1) it is remote from the parking and main
lodge facilities, commencing very close to the top of the
Gad I lift, so that a passenger on Gad II must first take
the tram or the Gad I lift in order to get to the Gad II
lift (R. 131); it takes the skier into difficult and steep
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terrain, with deep moguls which tend to make skiing the
area even more difficult (R. 131); the difficulty and remoteness both tend to discourage the average day-pass
skier and encourage use by season ticket holders (who
pay less for their skiing) and Snowbird employees (who
do not pay at all for their skiing) (R. 132); it is the last
lift to be opened on snow-hazard days because of the
avalanche danger in that particular \ticinity (R. 132);
avalanche danger keeps the Gad II lift closed all day
long more frequently than other Snowbird lifts (R. 132);
the Gad II lift is closed earlier in the day than other
lifts, as it sits nearer the top of the mountain and is the
first area to be "swept" by the safety ski patrol (R. 132);
and it is down for longer periods of time because of mechanical failure than the other lifts, because of its relative
remoteness from the main Snowbird facilities (R. 133).
According to this uncontradicted testimony of Weatherbee, the only witness before the court to testify concerning revenues who had any personal knowledge as to
the Gad II lift and the other Snowbird up-hill facilities,
the royalties due Caitmull under the 1966 Agreement for
1971-72 were $520, for 1972-73, $517, and for 1973-74,
$1,789, or a total sum of $3,826. The personal observations
of this knowledgeable expert are of far greater probaitive
value than the abstract formula and equation used by
the court. On the basis of Weatherbee's clear and uncontradicted testimony, this Court should reverse the trial
court's conclusions as to use of the Forest Service form-
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ula and remand for entry judgment consistent with
Weatherbee's testimony and personal observations.
Even if this Court concludes that use of a formula
is a better or more reliable basis for calculation of the
royalties than the testimony as to Weatheorbee's observations, use of the Forest Service formula is clearly
erroneous. The evidence before the trial court established that the Forest Service calculation fails to adequately evaluate skier use of any particular lift in that
it has no basis for evaluating the difficulties of the skiing terrain serviced by the lift (R. 161, 166, 189-90). The
Forest Service calculation considers only passenger capacity and slope distance as the relevant factors. It would
have to consider also the factor of vertical rise in order
to effectively assess the difficulty of the skiing terrain
(R. 189-90).
The evidence before the court indicated that ski resort areas and lift manufacturers around the country consider vertical rise as a necessary and relevant component
in evaluating ski lift performance in their advertising
and marketing (R. 171). The importance of this vertical
rise factor, when consideired together with passenger capacity and slope distance, was explained at length by
Weatherbee:
We are interested here in attempting to determine what gross revenues can be assigned to the
Gad II chair lift. None of these factors individually have anything to do with revenue. Taken
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all three together they come with a percentage
which by on-site observation is more accurate
than any other figure . . .
The capacity per hour is an assigned reading. It is built in when a lift is manufactured.
The cable slope distance is also a measured distance, and that involves the timing factors with
the length of the lift, the entire length of the
lift. And the vertical rise has to do with the difficulty of the terrain that lies underneath the
lift.
*

#

*

[ Y]ou have to have all three if you are going
to make any determination of revenue that can
be assigned to that lift because all three are tied
very, very closely together.
The Forest Service isn't interested in any
single lift producing revenue. They are interested in the whole shooting match at once. They
want to know everything about the whole area.
In this particular case we are only interested in assigning gross revenue to the Gad II
chair lift. Short of selling a Gad II ticket, which
we do not do, the only thing we can do is to come
up with a satisfactory basis of the facility which
most closely reaches what the on-site observations have been, and that its what I have tried
to do in this particular case (R. 189-190).
Weatherbee's calculations as to
posed formula, passenger capacity x
x vertical rise, were introduced into
20-D. Those calculations indicated

the use of this procable slope distance
evidence as Exhibit
that the percent of
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revenue attributable to Gad II was 15.9%, rather than
the Forest Service formula calculation of approximately
21%. The reduction is caused by the realistic appraisal
of the high vertical rise of the Gad II lift, and the relative
difficulty of the terrain crossed by the lift. The difficulty
of the terrain means that a more select, and smaller group
of skiers use the lift, and that it takes those skiers a
longer time to reach the bottom of the lift and re-board
the lift. According to Weatherbee's uncontradicted testimony, these factors are observable with respect to the
Gad II lift, and their impact should be reflected in the
calculation of revenue attributable to the Gad II life.
In light of the evidence before the court, it was reversible error of the trial court to adopt the less accurate
Forest Service formula for attributing revenue to the
Gad II lift. The evidence does not support the trial court's
use of that formula. This Court should reverse the trial
court's conclusion, and if any judgment be entered whatsoever under the 1966 Agreement using a formula for the
revenue calculation, it should be based upon the formula
of passenger capacity x cable length x vertical rise in
order that the revenue determination reflects the three
relevant factors of passenger load, lift length, and the
difficulty of the skiing terrain.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities,
which indicate an accumulation of errors made by the
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trial court, including the erroneous determination of the
royalty formula, it is respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed
Respectfully submitted,
Robert M. Anderson and
Jean L. Weaver of
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Appellants
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